Privacy & security

End user security psychology, part II: Can knowledge-based authentication be effective?

Bill Nagel
April 2, 2008

Bill Nagel

Another post on Finextra discusses some recent research out of New Zealand that determined that the longer an authentication process drags on — the more gantlets a user needs to run before being let in a site’s front door — the less secure those users perceive the site is.

Implementations of knowledge-based authentication (KBA) — asking "secret", out-of-wallet questions that presumably only the end user knows the answers to — on the Web have been on the rise in the past few years, particularly in online financial services, as part of efforts to fulfill FFIEC guidelines for additional risk mitigation measures that address the inadequacies of single-factor authentication. The concept of layered authentication — the riskier the transaction, the more stringent the authentication measures — is related to this, and KBA can be readily (and simplistically) adapted to layered authentication by simply increasing the number of secret questions that the system asks.

Of course, as a standalone method of authenticating users at login, asking out-of-wallet questions in addition to username and password doesn’t rise to the level of strong (two-factor) authentication, since they’re all variations on "what you know". So from a security standpoint it’s difficult for KBA to really provide identity assurance. But isn’t ease of use and peace of mind for end users that’s driving financial institutions to implement KBA? (Let’s put aside for a moment any cynicism about KBA being a cheap alternative for the FI.)

Apparently, though, there’s a point at which users’ confidence that the bank is protecting their assets tips over into suspicion that the bank’s security isn’t up to snuff or even that a fraudster is pumping them for personal information. And then there’s the annoyance factor: the inconvenience in terms of the time and effort to remember all of the PINs, passwords, and answers and jump through those hoops. It’s as if the typical Internet banking customer is a tender orchid needing just the right conditions to flourish.

The only problem is that in most cases this isn’t true. Buck up and spend the cash on a real two-factor authentication system, mandate its use, and customers will adapt — even thrive. There are enough different methods of two-factor out there that the difficult decision should not be whether to implement two-factor, but which form factor to choose.


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